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policymaker derives from the choice of a given level of financial consolidation is not related 
to the utility provided by the other alternative. In the factual approach the first crucial issue is 
the measurement of the policymaker’s choices, that is the definition of the dependent variable.  
 
3. Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Involvement 
The first problem when considering financial supervision concentration as a dependent 
variable, is to construct this variable. How can the degree of concentration of financial 
supervision powers be measured? To this end we use the financial authorities concentration 
index (FAC Index, Table 1B) proposed in Masciandaro (2004)2. The index has the maximum 
score (7) in countries where all the supervision responsibilities are in the hands of a single 
agency, this can be a new financial services authority – as in the UK or Germany – or the 
central bank – as in Ireland. Symmetrically, the index takes the minimum score (1) in 
countries with highly fragmentised supervisory regimes – as in the US or France. 
But we should also consider the nature of the institutions involved in supervisory 
responsibilities, focusing on the distinction between the central bank and any other form of 
institution at least for two reasons. 
First of all, any supervisory regime will have to provide a link between supervision and 
the central bank, given the potential relationship between monetary stability and financial 
stability. It has been pointed out correctly (Llewellyn 2005) that, irrespective of its role, the 
central bank is the ultimate authority for the systemic stability of the payment system. Thus, 
among the authorities that can have supervisory responsibility, the central bank has a special 
nature being the institution responsible for monetary policy. Furthermore, the special 
                                                 
2  The construction of the index is described in Appendix 8.1. 
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characteristics of the role played by the central bank have placed it in a central position with 
respect to the political system, the intermediaries, and the other control authorities. 
Secondly, in a movement towards full consolidation in supervision, one can think of two 
sharp alternatives: a monopolistic central bank or a pure single financial authority. In fact the 
policymaker can choose to delegate the management of monetary policy as well as financial 
supervision to the central bank. The second type of delegation separates the conduct of 
monetary policy from financial supervision, establishing a pure single financial authority. 
The debate on the characteristics of this link is particularly important in the European 
Union, where monetary policy is separated from financial supervision; See Lannoo (2000), 
Padoa Schioppa (2003), Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995), Eijffinger (2001), Vives (2001), 
Goodhart, Schoenmaker and Dasgupta (2002). Therefore we must ask which role the central 
bank plays in the various national supervisory regimes. We use the index of the central bank's 
involvement in financial supervision: the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA, 
Table 1B) also proposed in Masciandaro (2004)3. 
Note that in evaluating the role of the central bank in banking supervision, we consider the 
fact that, whatever the supervision regime is, the monetary authority has responsibility in 
pursuing the macro financial stability. The central bank can be involved in banking 
supervision tasks in Single Authority regimes, too. For example in Germany the Deutsche 
Bundesbank participates in banking supervision, in subordination to the Bundesanstalt fuer 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)’s issues. The Oesterreichische Nationalbank co-
operates with the Austrian Financial Market Authority continuing to conduct on-site 
inspection. The Estonian Bank has no role in supervision, but its President is a member of the 
Financial Authority Board, and two other members are chosen by the central bank. In the 
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other cases, the central bank remains involved in pursuing the overall financial stability. 
Therefore, we choose as rule of thumb the relative role of the central bank: we assign a 
greater value – if the central bank is the unique or the main responsible for banking 
supervision. 
The analysis of the degree of financial supervision concentration and the level of central 
bank involvement provide a general picture of the supervisory regimes around the world. In 
fact, each national supervisory regime can be identified with at least two characteristics: the 
degree of concentration of powers (FAC Index) and the degree of involvement of the central 
bank in that distribution of powers (CBFA Index). From a theoretical point of view, given the 
two possible choices of the policymaker highlighted above, we can observe the relationship 
between the FAC Index and the CBFA Index. The worldwide comparative picture is quite 
interesting. The two most frequent models are polarized: on the one hand, countries with a 
high unification of powers show a low central bank involvement (Single Financial Authority 
Regime); on the other hand, in countries with a low concentration of powers, the central bank 
is highly involved (Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors Regime).  
The descriptive evidence of the two most frequent financial supervision regimes seems to 
correct the idea that, given the blurring process in the financial landscape, there are two 
possible kinds of supervisory approach: 1) unification under the roof of the central bank; and 
2) unification in a different supervisory body. Actually the unification of supervision seems 
more evident in the case of Single Financial Authorities Regimes, while in the case of 
Central Bank-Dominated Multiple Supervisors Regimes the approach seems more consistent 
with a “leader-followers” framework. It is a matter of fact that in a multi-authority model the 
central bank tends to assume the position of “first among peers”, at least for historical 
reasons. In other words, the descriptive analysis shows an interesting result: the national 
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choice on how many agencies must be involved in supervision is strictly linked to the role of 
the central bank. The degree of supervision unification seems to be inversely correlated with 
central bank involvement (central bank fragmentation effect).  
 
4. Beyond the Central Bank Involvement in Supervision? The Role of Monetary 
Commitment and Central Bank Independence  
How do we explain this fragmentation effect given by the involvement of the central 
bank in supervision?  
We claimed that the central bank fragmentation effect can be explained as a special case 
of rule-driven path dependence. The concept of rule driven path dependence has been 
recently used in the corporate governance literature: see among others, Bebchuk and Roe 
(2000), Clark and Wojcik (2003). Rule-driven path dependence exists when, other conditions 
being equal, the choice of a given design of rules depends on characteristics already existing 
or already determined by the rules themselves.  
In this case, a given policymaker’s choice of supervision concentration level will depend 
on the role the central bank plays in the supervision, or that the policymaker has decided to 
have the central bank play. In other words, the policymaker’s choice can be viewed as a 
sequential process in which the institutional status quo matters: the supervision 
concentration level is decided on the basis of the current position of the central bank. If the 
role of the central bank is limited, the supervision concentration level will probably be high 
and vice versa. 
 
4.1 Low Central Bank Involvement in Supervision 
